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The First Aillendment
andNe\'V
Coillillunications
Technologies
Statement of

Lee C. Bollinger,
Professor of Law, The University of Michigan
Before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and

The proliferation of new technologies of communication
dazzles us all. Around us is the promise of abundance and
diversity; even our vocabulary is expanding , as people talk
of "dishes ," " dbs ," ' videotext," and "home information centers." Amidst the confusion that often reigns over discussions about what the future will be , there is an anticipation
of a life filled with a superabundance of information and
ideas. How much will turn out to be reality and how much
airy speculation it is now impossible to say. We can be sure,
however, that there will be change , and, to a major degree ,
the form it will take will depend upon a myriad of choices
we will make as we move through this period of technological transition. What fundamental principles what values ,
should guide the making of those choices?
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
will set the boundaries of our choice-making capacity. What
are those limits likely to be? The First Amendment is more
than a negative statement about the limits of state involvement in the domain of expression. It is also for us a positive
embodiment of basic social values which can, and should
guide the policy choices permitted us . What, then are the
values embodied in the First Amendment to which we
should refer when facing the difficult choices ahead as we
define the nature and shape of the American mass media?
These are the subjects of this paper.
I
As we look for guidance in defining the present and
future constitutional limits to congressional authority in the
communications field , our attention should first turn to our
past experience with radio and television. History may occasionally, or even often be a poor indicator of the future ,
but, as has been said, it may be one of the few we have. If
we can acquire an understanding of the way in which the
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, responded to the
transition from a print medium to a bifuracted print and
electronic mass media, we will be much better prepared to
anticipate the role the First Amendment will play in the
next stage of technological evolution. However, a simple
application of past responses to the future will not work. We
must also try to anticipate in what ways the future will
diverge significantly from the past and , to the extent th~t it
will, devise new policies which take account of those differences. Finally, we must also reach some judgment about
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how well the past has worked in fact before we extend its
life.
We have only recently begun to appreciate that our half
century of experience with government oversight of the
electronic media and of the judicial response to that official
involvement in the press deserves our serious attention and
study. Part of the broadcast regulation experience has been
the ignoring of it, partly because it was new and complicated and partly because it diverged so greatly from our
inherited tradition of freedom of the press . The recent emergence of a "press" identity within the electronic media has
had the salutary effect of leading us to wonder how we got
to where we are and what lessons inhere in that experience
which might enhance our understanding of the development
of new technologies of communication.
As one studies this past half century of broadcast regulation and th~ First Amendment, many important lessons
stand out. The most significant would appear to be the fact
that the courts seem generally prepared to permit experimentation with regulation , as we seek to cope with the
exigencies of technological change. The courts have not kept
the government in a straightjacket of traditional principles
but rather have recognized that new problems may demand
new responses. This attitude was an especially essential
one to take with broadcasting because some degree of government supervision and allocation was imperative given the
potential problems of frequency overuse and interference.
The government was impelled to enter the field and to
engage in an allocating function because chaos was the only
alternative. Once this step had been taken, the incremental
impact of a more expansive regulatory role on our traditional
notions of a free press was significantly lessened. This reality, in a totally new and unexplored medium, seemed to
justify a government-press relationship that would not have
been tolerated anywhere else.
The relationship was however, carefully tailored to satisfy
many of our traditional principles. One critical limitation
on government involvement was embodied in section 326 of
the Communications Act, which provided that the government could not "censor" any particular material broadcast
over the airwaves. On the other hand, the government could
promote "diversity" of viewpoints, establish broad standards
of "fairness" to regulate discussion of public issues and
insist on general subject-matter categories for programming
in order to insure that the "public interests," broadly con-

ceived, were met by the new media. In short, the government's role was severely limited, according to traditional
norms, on the "negative" side of censorship, but greatly
enlarged on the "affirmative" side of expanding the range
of dis ussion over the airwaves.
However, it is incorrect to think that the Supreme Court
has respond d with a carte blanche to the government in its
efforts to regulate the electronic media even in affirmative
ways. While it is true that the Court has been extremely
tolerant of the broadcast regulatory scheme, it is also the
ase that its tolerance has been of a special variety. In general terms I would characterize the Court's response to
broadcast regulation as one infused with ambiguity and even
confusion. Its tolerance was most often one of Delphic
silence: while decades passed and the Court was erecting an
imposing edifice of First Amendment doctrine, it chose
largely to ignore the efforts of Congress and its administrative agency, the Federal Radio Commission, and then the
Federal Communications Commission to arrive at a viable
federal communications policy. Silence is, of course, an act
of extreme ambiguity. It can be interpreted as tacit approval
or endorsement, as temporary uncertainty as to the proper
response, or as a mere biding of time until the moment is
ripe for definitive reversal . The Court waited 16 years until it
gave a summary constitutional approval to the general regulatory system (in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States ,
319 U.S. 190) in 1943, and then another 26 until it affirmed
the constitutionality of the most important regulation in
the overall scheme, the fairness doctrine (in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. , 295 U.S. 367) in 1969.
Even when the Court did speak on the constitutional
issues raised by regulation and extended the constitutional
imprimatur, it did so in a peculiar way. In ational Broadcasting Co. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court and
treated the First Amendment question as so obvious as to
merit little consideration. In one sense such a positive
endorsement of the constitutionality of broadcast regulation

would seem the most encouraging to its proponents: but
in another sense it suggests a lack of studied examination or
appreciation of the real issues at stake, a failure on the part
of the Court to see and grapple with the problems raised
by regulation. Decisions that find difficult questions
"obvious" are never very secure as precedents.
In Red Lion the Court did finally engage in a full-scale
consideration of the constitutionality of one major form of
regulation. There the Court did extend what appeared to be
an unconditional approval. In words that seemed to solidly
entrench and legitimate the entire regulator scheme, the
Court said:

Congress itself recognized in section 326, which forb i~s FCC interference with "the right of free speech by means of rad10
communication." Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in fa vor
of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.
But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is
the right of the viewers and listeners , not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. ... It is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral , and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right ma y not
constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.

Not long after the Court spoke these words , however it
spoke others which seemed to convey the sense that it was
moving in precisely the opposite direction from that begun
in Red Lion . First came Columbia Broadcasting System , Inc.
v. Democratic ational Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). There
the Court rejected a claim that the First Amendment compelled broadcasters to permit private individuals or groups
to purchase airtime in order to broadcast their political viewpoints. The FCC had refused to require broadcasters to sell
commercial airtime for editorial advertisements, and the
Court declined the invitation to reverse the Commission's
decision on First Amendment or statutory grounds. On this
basis alone one would not have expected the underlying
principles of Red Lion to undergo any erosion. but the path
of reasoning which the Court took in reaching its result in
CBS did cut against them. For the first time the Court spoke
of broadcasters in terms familiar to the print media: they
were referred to as "editors" and "journalists,' and their role
was envisioned as akin to their counterparts in the print
media. In another famous Supreme Court dictum, the Court
remarked that "editing is what editors are for," thereb conveying the idea that broadcasters were to be thought of as
similar to editors and journalists in the print media. Much is
in a name, and it is an important indicator of judicial attitudes whether a broadcaster is referred to as a "public
trustee" or as a "journalist."
One year later the Court decided Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo , -118 U.S. 241 (1974). Florida had adopted a
statute requiring newspapers to grant political candidates a
right to reply to criticisms of them appearing in the newspaper. The Supreme Court struck down the statute as
unconstitutional because it infringed on the First Amendment freedom of the press . Recognizing the existence of
serious problems of concentration and monopolization in the
print media , the Court nevertheless found no constitutional
room for a policy allowing states to compel what goes into a
newspaper. Their language indicated an unyielding, inflexible resol e to preserve a totally free press:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply
with a compulsor access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply , the Florida
statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of
its intrusion into the function of editors . A newspaper is more than a
passive receptacle or conduit for news , comment, and advertising .
The choice of material to go into a newspaper. and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or

By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned
those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses
are refused. A license permits broadcasting. but the licensee has
no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to
monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.
There is nothing in the First Amendment which pre ents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others
and to conduct himself as a pro y or fiduciar with obligations to
present those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred
from the airwaves .
This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant to public
broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a major role to play as the
35

unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time."

Though this perspective on the meaning of the freedom of
the press concept was enunciated only with respect to the
print media and though the Court did not even refer to its
earlier decision in Red Lion , it was impossible for the
Court's statements to read as having no import for the question of legitimacy of broadcast regulation. Not surprisingly,
the passage of time since the Miami Herald decision has
brought forth a variety of comment the general tenor of
which has been to take that decision as casting a substantial
shadow of doubt over the Red Lion decision itself.
The process we can observe in the sequence of cases from
Red Lion to Miami Herald reflects an underlying and profound ambivalence in attitude towards government
regulation of the technology of broadcasting. The Court has
been prepared to tolerate certain forms of "affirmative" regulation as the new technology emerged and developed, but
the Court s tolerance was infected with a considerable degree
of anxiety. Sometimes this ambivalence has been expressed
through a stony silence; but even when the Court spoke
out and, in some cases, appeared to give its wholehearted
endorsement to the enterprise of regulation, it then felt the
necessity of cutting back on that approval and undermining
its own endorsement by making it appear something of an
anomaly.
And well the Court should. For it is certainly the case that
official intervention, even of an 'affirmative" variety, carries
with it significant risks. It represents a major departure from
our traditional libertarian notions towards the concept of
freedom of the press. Stability of traditions has social value
independent of its particular applications, but it is also the
case that government regulation of the press, even in the
name of the "public interest," can be used in authoritarian,
repressive ways, both obvious and subtle. Even when
applied and enforced in an even-handed, fair-minded way,
such regulations invariably reflect a particular attitude, or
set of attitudes, about such fundamental issues as: what is the
proper function and role of the press in American life; what
should the American public be interested in listening to
and thinking about; and a host of other value-laden issues
about which people may reasonably disagree. In short, any
government regulation is much more than simply the sum of
the particular consequences emanating from the application
of the rules to particular cases; it is also, and this may be the
more important point, an injection into the arena of public
debate, through the very act of reshaping it, of a set of values , or a particular philosophy , about the basic structure
of American life.
It is also the case, and this is what leads to a willingness
to tolerate regulation in the first instance, that the problems
we perceive as justifying regulation are very real in themselves. Concentration, whether the result of physical or
economic factors , within the mass media raises serious concerns about the successful operation of the "marketplace
of ideas," as serious as those arising from government intervention itself. We cannot accept the facile conclusion that
private enterprise in the mass media acts merely to "give the
36

public what it wants." It does that in part, to be sure, but it
also, we may reasonably assume, shapes the very tastes to
which it claims to be responsive. How much is one and how
much the other will remain always a mystery to us, but our
inability to decipher the line between the two should not
lead us naively to ignore the common feeling of dissatisfaction at having to choose among the limited array of choices
offered by the marketplace. Not in every instance do we feel
we fully know what our "wants" are, and even on those
occasions when we do and even when they are shared by
substantial numbers of people, it may be years, if ever,
before any market rises to meet them. In a medium that
provides a limited and standardized fare, whether or not
dictated by economic considerations of a mass market, we
may properly worry about the unmet needs of diverse
groups whose interests place them on the periphery of general public tastes. These considerations, and others that
might be mentioned, provide a forceful case for intervention.

However, the costs of intervention are real, and consequential. The upshot has been, in terms of the role played by
the First Amendment, that affirmative regulation has been
tolerated but only as an anomaly in a broader system otherwise free from intrusion.
II

The development of cable television and the judicial treatment of the regulation of it have been especially revealing
about our acceptance and fears of government regulation
under the First Amendment. One often hears the argument
that, since the legitimacy of broadcast regulation has been
premised on the scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum
and since cable virtually eliminates the problem of scarcity
(because cables may carry as many channels as may be
wanted), government regulation of cable is unconstitutional.
It is only a short extension from this to the conclusion that
regulation of all broadcast media is now (or soon will be)
unconstitutional-not because the electromagnetic spectrum
is no longer scarce but because the abundance of cable channels eliminates the problem of scarcity in the medium, that
is to say, television, and it is the medium and not the partiuclar methods of reaching the medium that should be the
relevant consideration on the constitutional issue. I reject
this analysis.
First, it is true that, since the NBC case in 1943, the Court
has espoused the scarcity rationale as the principal justification for government regulation of broadcasting. Justice White
in Red Lion spoke in these terms: "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Though
there have been other efforts to distinguish broadcasting
from the print media, thereby justifying the imposition of
regulation on the former and not the latter (such as the fact
that broadcasters must use the "public" airwaves in order to

broadcast or that "impact" of broadcasting on its audience
is sufficiently overwhelming to justify oversight) the scarcity
rationale has been the dominant point of departure for justifying regulation.
The best that can be said of the scarcity rationale, however, is that it has been a convenient, if invalid, basis for
upholding the regulatory enterprise. The potential chaos of a
totally unregulated, unallocated, medium surely did , and
continues to , justify minimal government intervention to
establish guidelines for effective use of the airwaves. This in
itself could be achieved by the issuance of licenses , along
with other technical restrictions ; but. as various economists
and legal theorists have now pointed out, these technical
considerations do not alone justify the added measure of
government supervision regarding the content of the
medium. Rather than giving away licenses free and insisting
that certain programming requirements be satisfied by the
licensee, the government could have imposed some technical
restrictions necessary to minimize or eliminate interference
but allowed market forces to regulate content, in the same
way that we rely on them to exert pressure on the content of
other media throughout the society, most notably of course,
the print medium.
To discount the scarcity rationale does not leave us without any justification or rationale for the choice to regulate
broadcasting so as to achieve a more diversified and fair
discussion of political and social issues. I have already identified what to many is a critical problem with the broadcast
media, as they are presently composed-namely , that of
excessive concentration. While it is true that the print
medium is characterized by a similar problem, some might
say even more seriously afflicted, that in itself does not
establish the necessity of either extending regulation
throughout the media or disallowing it entirely. A sensible
solution to dealing with the underlying problem of concentration and power has been the one we have , in fact ,
employed, albeit perhaps inadvertently-that is, imposing
corrective regulation in one segment of the media (the new

technology of broadcasting) while retaining a traditional
hands-off posture with respect to the other (the traditional
technology of print). This limited, restrained approach to
remedying perceived defects in the structure of the marketplace of ideas has proved effective both in terms of enhancing public debate and in reducing the risks common]
associated with government intervention, and for that reason-not because of such artificial differences between the
media as the idea of scarcity-the regulatory enterprise has,
in my judgment, proved acceptable to the courts when challenged under the First Amendment.
This means that we should find the development of cable
and its enlarged channel capacity will not in itself fundamentally alter the regulatory system as it has heretofore
existed. As long as the phenomenon of concentration, of
audience domination, continues, the basic underlying issue,
which has in the past justified regulation, will continue to
do so.
The Supreme Court appears to be following this path. In
the Court's first decision concerning FCC regulation of cable,
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S . 157 (1968),

the Court upheld the Commission's "local carriage" rule
which prohibited some cable systems from importing broadcast signals without Commission approval. The purpose of
the rule was to protect the economic viability of local broadcasters. The Court found the rule to be "reasonably ancillary
to the effective performance of the Commission's responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting ." Subsequently, in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S.
649 (1972) , the Court divided on the question whether
to uphold the statutory validity of the Commission's "program orientation" rule , which provided that "no CATV
system having 3,500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the system also
operates to a significant extent as a local outlet b y cablecasting and has available facilities for local production and
presentation of programs other than automated services ."
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four justices, found
that the "effect of the regulation .. . is to assure that in the
retransmission of broadcast signals viewers are provided
suitably diversified programming ," an effect which those
justices believed consistent with the basic rationale of the
Court's earlier broadcasting decision. The four remaining
justices dissented on the ground that the Communications
Act did not empower the FCC to order anyone "to enter the
broadcasting field ."
These decisions strongly suggest that the Court will not be
inclined to insist as a matter of constitutional principle that
the government deregulate broadcasting because of the emergence of the new technology of cable. On the contrary, they
indicate that the regulatory system over broadcasting is
secure and itself provides the justification for at least some
extension of regulation over the cable medium itself. It is
true that in neither of these decisions did the Court consider
a First Amendment challenge to the Commission's regulations regarding cable. The Court is certainly free later under
these precedents to reject the entire statutory scheme as
unconstitutional; but, as a practical matter it seems less than
likely to occur given the Court's handling of the cases .
All this is not to say, however, that cable and its associated technologies will not or should not affect the Court's
general treatment of the regulatory system. The new issues
raised by the emerging technologies and their potential for
achieving diversity and fairness also suggest a need for
congressional reevaluation, which the Court should encourage. This need was recently recognized in the Court's latest
cable decision, FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. , 440 U.S . 689
(1979) , where the Court found the FCC without statutory
authority to require cable operators to provide channels and
equipment for public, educational , governmental , or leased
access users or to insist upon a specified channel capacity.
We might well expect, as the new technologies develop , the
Court to demand that Congress periodically reassess its regulatory policies. It is also possible that the Court will go even
further and intimate at. or even openly pronounce, a general
First Amendment obligation on the part of the government
to encourage, or at least not to inhibit, the development
of these new technologies, which at least in theory offer the
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potential of diversity without government regulation. This.
in fact , may be the implicit motivation behind the 1979 Midwest Video decision. Surel one of the more unfortunate
consequences of the early Commission regulatory scheme
regarding cable was its serious inhibition of cable's economic development.
For the moment and the foreseeable future , however, one
must conclude that the basic structure of the regulatory system, both with respect to broadcasting and to the new
technologies , is constitutionally permissible. That in any
event, is the recent message of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC , 49 USLW 4891 (1981) , where the Court
upheld the statutory and constitutional validity of the Commission's interpretation of Section 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act.
In summary, regulation in the interest of promoting diversity of opinion and fairness in public discussion will
continue to be a stepchild of the First Amendment concept
of a free press , never fully embraced, always uncertain of its
precise status and pedigree but still kept comfortably within
the general home. The general problem which characterizes
the electronic media and which justifies regulation in the
"public interest" that is to say concentration of power, and
not the fiction of "scarcity" will continue to provide the
central if underlying rational for regulation, both of broadcasting and of the newer electronic technologies.

and we might lose in the process that intangible but nevertheless vital sense within the press of being independent and
to some degree "una countable" to anything but journalisti
standards. This is not to sa , however. that the government
would be completel foreclosed from pursuing other avenues
of promoting diversity and encouraging vigorous debate.
Channels might be reserved for public use, and financial
support might be provided for alternative programming.
along the model of the public broadcasting system .
Conclusion

The new technologies of communication demand that we
be prepared to reappraise some of our policies with respect
to regulation of the electronic media. They are also entitled
to a favorable environment in which to develop , but their
eme rgence does not for the near future entirely undermine
the system of affirmative regulation of the electronic medium
in the "public interest." The same principles which have
guided the development of broadcast regulaton- promotion
of diversity and fairness in public discussion-continue to
provide meaningful and legitimate goals within this discrete
branch of the mass media.

III
I have thus far argued that the radical departure from
traditional libertarian notions of freedom of the press represented by the American experiment in broadcast regulation
has been possible only because there has existed a sharp
delineation between the two branches of the mass media. It
was important that regulation was introduced in a new discrete technology at a time when the traditional libertarian
model was coming under increasing question as the sources
of news were growing fewer in number. In the bifurcated
system that developed one branch of the media was treated
as "unique" and "special" and accordingly subject to regulation in the "public interest" while the other branch was
regarded as representing the embodiment of traditional
notions of the press and hence left completely unregulated.
We thus preserved tradition while experimenting in the face
of changed circumstances. To many, including myself, this
method of dealing with the evolution of the mass media and
the concept of a free press has seemed eminently sensible.
Yet a further change in technology looms on the horizon
that may well call into serious question the system of regulation we have developed. I have in mind here the use by the
print media of television and video screens as a means of
disseminating their news and information. The technology
goes by such names as "videotext" and "teletext. " Though it
is now in its most rudimentary experimental stages, many
foresee it as the principal method of distribution in the next
decade. What are the implictions of this technological
change for a system of regulation that has been constructed
on a principle of partiality and duality?
For several reasons , it would appear to be undesirable at
any future stage of technological merger between the print
and electronic media to continue with a system of partial
regulation. Singling out only some channel users for regulation would probably seem in that context too anomalous.
Moreover, no viable distinction could be drawn between, for
example, communication through words or through visual
images and sound. We will feel compelled to choose
whether or not to regulate at all. Though it is difficult now
to assess how that choice should , or will , be made in the
distant future , the presumption should be, I think, against,
rather than for , total regulation. Total regulation would
remove the checks inherent in a system of partial regulation,
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